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ADOPTION AND TERMINATION
PROCEEDINGS IN WISCONSIN:
A REPLY PROPOSING
LIMITING JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
Lucy COOPER*
PATRICIA NELSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate between those persons loosely labelled "pro-
child" or "pro-adoption" and those labelled "pro-parent" is
a long standing one and probably will never be resolved.'
Also unresolved is the debate between those who advocate
giving broad discretion to juvenile court judges and those
who advocate a much more limited jurisdictional system.'
Our purpose here is to continue the debate, as this article
is written as a response to a previous article Adoption and
Termination Proceedings in Wisconsin: Straining the Wisdom
* B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1968; J.D., University of Wisconsin,
Madison, 1972; Director, Family Law Center, Edhlund, Rachofsky & Cooper, S.C.,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
** B.A., University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 1971; J.D., Marquette University
Law School, 1974; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law
School.
1. See, e.g., Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922). In this case the
majority cites ties of natural affection between biological parent and child and em-
phasizes the parent's right to due process. As with many of these cases, the court was
split, and there is a ringing dissent emphasizing the importance of stability for the
child and the importance of encouraging adoption.
2. See generally D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT (1964); A. PLATT, THE
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1977). See also In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967).
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of Solomon,3 which we view as "proadoption." Our article
will contend that court intervention in families should be
limited, because discretion is fraught with dangers - dan-
gers of class or racial bias as well as simple fallibility. It will
also examine Wisconsin's recent legislation regarding chil-
dren who are the subjects of placement or termination
proceedings.
The child protection, termination and adoption process
does not operate in a social vacuum.4 The problems of infer-
tility among couples who want children,5 combined with the
increasing number of women raising their out of wedlock
children,6 and the increasing number of abortions performed
in the last ten years,7 has diminished greatly the number of
healthy infants available for adoption.8 In addition, many
more people are adopting older, handicapped and minority
children - children who used to be considered "unadopt-
able."9 These trends may encourage easy terminations of
parental rights. Thus, it is even more important to preserve
the legal protections of biological parents in the face of pres-
sures to give children to someone "better."
II. BEST INTEREST: A MEANINGLESS PHRASE
The previous article argues that current Wisconsin law
sets too high a threshold before a court may consider the
3. Hayes & Morse, Adoption and Termination Proceedings in Wisconsin: Straining
the Wisdom of Solomon, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 439 (1983).
4. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816 (1977), which includes a lengthy discussion of the social context in which child
protection proceedings arise.
5. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1982, at 102-10 ("As many as 3-1/2 million
American couples - about one in five - are infertile.").
6. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-20,
No. 372, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENT: Mar. 1981, Table D (1982);
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-20, No. 371, HOUSE-
HOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: Mar. 1981, Z, 224 (1982); ALAN
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, TEENAGE PREGNANCY: THE PROBLEM THAT HASN'T
GONE AWAY 27 (1981); Milwaukee J., Oct. 26, 1981, at 2, col. 4.
7. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 102 ed., STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 65-68 (1981); PUBLIC HEALTH SERVS., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PREFACE, SUMMARY 29 (1980); THE WORLD ALMA-
NAC & BOOK OF FACTS 1983 (1983).
8. Conversation with JoEl Demant, Lutheran Social Services (Feb. 16, 1983).
9. Conversation with Kay Pena, Regional Representative of the North American
Council on Adoptive Children (Feb. 16, 1983).
[Vol. 66:641
1983] ADOPTION AND TERMINATION: A REPLY 643
best interest of the child and subordinates the interest of the
child to the rights of the birth parent. 10 We disagree. Best
interest is so amorphous a concept that it should not be con-
sidered until and unless facts are proven which raise serious
questions about the existence or viability of the parent-child
relationship." The protections accorded to parental rights
are simply legislative and judicial recognition of the human
belief that "blood is thicker than water."' 12
The problem with the best interest standard is that it has
no content without further definition. It may become a mere
facade behind which social workers, lawyers and judges hide
when making decisions based on intuition, personal likes
and dislikes, armchair psychology, and ideology so deeply
rooted that the decision makers are unaware that it is mere
ideology. 13
10. Hayes & Morse, supra note 3, at 482-94.
11. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: Standards of
Removalfrom Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976). See also Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (Supp. V 1982). The Indian Child Wel-
fare Act provides that:
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the
absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of
the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emo-
tional or physical damage to the child.
Id. § 1901.2(f).
12. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56,
66 (1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
13. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 17 (1979). See also State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis.
2d 1,207 N.W.2d 826 (1973), in which Chief Justice Hallows, writing for the majority,
stated:
The phrase "best interests of the child" means all things to all people; it
means one thing to a juvenile judge, another thing to adoptive parents, and
still something different to disinterested observers.... mhe tendency in
man is to apply intuition in deciding that a child would be "better" with one
set of parents than with another and then express this intuitive feeling in terms
of the legal standard of being "in the best interests of the child."
59 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 207 N.W.2d 826, 831 (1973).
See also Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (Supp. V 1982).
In this legislation, Congress removed from the states child custody jurisdiction over
reservation Indians after a legislative finding "that an alarmingly high percentage of
Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children
from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high per-
centage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and
institutions... ." Id. § 1901(4).
MARQUVETE LAW REVIEW
The desire to punish mothers engaging in interracial re-
lationships has motivated soie custody decisions. In one
case, a judge removed a child from his mother in a child
protection proceeding at least in part because she was living
with a black man.' 4 Recently, a state supreme court over-
turned the removal of a white child from his white mother
after she had a child by a black man.'5 The trial judge com-
mented in his decision that the local community was not
ready for that kind of integration.' 6
Political prejudice also can be found in at least one deci-
sion of the 1950's in which a mother with left wing political
beliefs lost custody of her child partly because the judge
thought anyone who was a Communist must be a bad par-
ent. 7  Courts sometimes employ a religious bias as well.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned a trial court deci-
sion in which a judge denied custody to a mother in favor of
a father because the mother was an agnostic, while the father
was religious. I8
Courts also tend to use custody cases as a forum for com-
ment on sexual morality and as a vehicle for punishing what
the trial judges view as immorality.' 9 The effect of this has
been a tendency for judges to punish women who stray from
the straight and narrow path of sexual fidelity or who engage
in nonmarital sexual activity. This "bad girl standard" is
alive and well in Illinois, 20 where a transfer of custody away
from a custodial mother was approved solely because the
mother resided with a man to whom she was not married.
There was no evidence that the man was in any way cruel to
14. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
15. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 249 Ga. 689, 292 $.E.2d 821 (1982).
16. Subsequently, the mother again lost custody of her son, this time because of
her "sexual irresponsibility" and "unstable lifestyle." Milwaukee J., Mar. 15, 1983, at
4, col. 1.
17. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952). In this case the trial
court denied the mother custody of the child. The court of appeals reversed the lower
court's order and returned custody to the mother.
18. Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis. 2d 570, 129 N.W.2d 134 (1964).
19. See Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965) (summa-
rizing a few of the "morality" custody cases in Wisconsin). In Wendland the court
refused to overturn a trial court's award of custody to an adulteress. The other cases
involve "scandalized" courts removing custody from adulterous mothers.
20. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
927 (1980).
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the children or that the children were unhappy or malad-
justed.' Wisconsin courts, both at the trial court and the
Supreme Court levels, vacillate on this "bad girl" issue. In
some cases the best interest test seems to include a require-
ment that the custodian not have a paramour.2 In other
cases, while the court criticizes sexual immorality, the best
interest standard is held to require that the custodian's sex-
ual immorality have some adverse effect on the child before
custody is transferred. 3
The issue of a parent's economic status as an element of
best interest also arises. For example, in 1962 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision in a divorce
case where the mother appeared to have lost custody more
because of her lower economic circumstances than for any
other reason.2 4 Still, many lawyers who litigate custody
cases learn to dread the fight on behalf of an impoverished
single parent against the two-parent home with a backyard
and trees, regardless of how well adjusted the child may
have been before the custody dispute began.
The Wisconsin Legislature has partially defined the wide
open best interest test in custody disputes between parents.2 -
The definition focuses on the child's relationship with each
parent26 and with the people in that parent's surrounding
family and circle of friends, as well as upon the feasibility
of eich parent's custodial plan for the child. 8 Still, the court
may consider "such other factors as the court may in each
individual case determine to be relevant. ' 29 Proceeding
under this section one trial court decided that a highly rele-
vant factor was the mother's refusal to move back to Mil-
waukee over a year after moving 250 miles away to
Rhinelander. The trial judge transferred custody of the
21. Id. at _ 400 N.E.2d at 422.
22. See, e.g., Bliffert v. Bliffert, 14 Wis. 2d 316, 111 N.W.2d 188 (1961).
23. See, e.g., Goembel v. Goembel, 60 Wis. 2d 130, 208 N.W.2d 416 (1973);
Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
24. Bohn v. Bohn, 16 Wis. 2d 258, 114 N.W.2d 423 (1962).
25. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(2) (1981-1982).
26. Id. § 767.24(2)(b).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 768.24(2)(d)-(e).
29. Id. § 767.24(2)().
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three children to their father.3 °
The problems with applying a best interest test in cus-
tody disputes between parents are multiplied tenfold when a
parent is pitted against the resources of the state. Usually
the parent is poor, and, in child protection or termination
proceedings, he or she has often done something that the
professionals in the child protection system think is defi-
cient.3 1 As the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v.
Kramer32 stated, "[blecause the parents subject to termina-
tion proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of
minority groups such proceedings are often vulnerable to
judgments based on cultural or class bias. 33
In these proceedings various phrases come to stand as a
kind of judicial shorthand for social values which remain
unexamined. For instance, there appears to be an assump-
tion that the disadvantages of being raised as an illegitimate
child automatically renders adoption in the best interest of
an out of wedlock child.34 Because of the stigma of illegiti-
macy, it is urged, a child's best interest requires not letting
biological parents, particularly out of wedlock fathers, have
any say in whether a child is adopted.35
Since 1973, with the publication of Beyond the Best Inter-
30. The supreme court reversed. Groh v. Groh, 110 Wis. 2d 117,327 N.W.2d 665
(1983). It is important to note that the decisions discussed here are appellate court
rulings; only a small percentage of trial court decisions come under such scrutiny.
31. See Wald, supra note 11, at 628-29.
32. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
33. Id. at 762-63. Other examples of the misuses to which a wide open best inter-
est standard can be put in child protection proceedings are noted in J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 13, at 65-85, in which the authors catalogue cases of
removal based on bias or simple mistake.
34. See, e.g., In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 572-74, 331 N.E.2d 486, 489-
90, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515-17 (1975) (where the court uses the term "out of wedlock
stigma"). Many other jurists appear to accept, without further discussion, the impor-
tance of supporting the process of adoption of out of wedlock children even where
biological parents do not want the children to be adopted. See Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) ("[ajdoption will remove the stigma under which illegitimate
children suffer"). See also Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2996 n.25 (1983); In re
Baby Girl K, 113 Wis. 2d 429, - N.W.2d - (1983).
35. Id. For a contrasting view, see In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d
27 (1967), which criticizes the presumption that adoption is inherently in the best
interest of an out of wedlock child and a criticism of the glib use of the "stigma of
illegitimacy" phrase to justify denial of an out of wedlock father's claim to custody.
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ests of the Child,36 the concept of "psychological parent" has
received a great deal of attention from courts and commen-
tators.37 The authors of this widely acclaimed treatise argue
that the relationship between psychological parent and child
is the primary factor in every child's best interest and that
courts must always preserve and protect that relationship.38
The psychological parent concept is, however, new and very
controversial. Experts disagree about the validity of the con-
cept 39 and about its application, both to the child welfare
system in general4 and to decisions about a particular
child's placement. 41 It is premature, to say the least, to jetti-
son the firmly rooted and ancient protections for biological
families in favor of recently discovered "truths" about child
development.
To criticize the generalized, vague best interest test for
removal and termination cases is not to argue against the
exercise of judicial discretion. Courts are and must be free
to consider a psychological parent-child tie and other factors
which may affect the interests of the child, but only after the
existence of specific statutory grounds for intervention have
been proven.
36. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973).
37. See, e.g., Strauss & Strauss, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 996 (1974)
(critical review which nevertheless notes the impact of the book).
38. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 36, at 17-20. See also J.
GOLDSTEIN, A FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 13, at 39-57. See generally Hayes &
Morse, supra note 3.
39. See Strauss & Strauss, supra note 37. See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SOLNIT, supra note 13, at 199-202 n.10, in which the authors cite some works which
would seem to contradict their theories about the central importance of psychological
parenthood and the disastrous effects of separation trauma. The authors, it should be
noted, are not persuaded and stick by their original thesis. See In re J.L.W., 102 Wis.
2d 118, 139, 306 N.W.2d 46, 57 (1981), for the Wisconsin Supreme Court's view that
some of the current pronouncements regarding separation trauma "would appear to
be gross oversimplification."
40. Strauss & Strauss, supra note 37.
41. See In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981) (psychologists' ex-
pert opinions were sharply at odds). See also In re R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297
N.W.2d 833 (1980), in which one psychologist insisted that separation trauma would
be the central and disastrous event of R.P.R's life if he were removed from his adop-
tive home. Another psychologist insisted that suffering rejection trauma at a later
date would be far worse in the long run than separation trauma.
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III. CHILD PROTECTION AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS IN WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin Legislature has revamped Wisconsin's
child protection, termination and adoption laws.42 The revi-
sion was a response to landmark United States Supreme
Court decisions holding that juvenile courts must afford cer-
tain due process rights to parents and children,43 to argu-
ments that the discretion of courts had been too broad44 and
to failures of the system such as "foster care drift."45 Wis-
consin's termination of parental rights legislation must be
looked at in the context of its child protection laws as a
whole.
A. Changes in Child Protection Laws
In 1977 the legislature made major changes in the laws
governing what were then called delinquency, dependency
and neglect proceedings. Chapter 35446 was the first major
revision of the 1955 Children's Code. The reforms it con-
tained veered sharply away from the earlier Code's broad
grant of authority to juvenile court judges to make place-
ment decisions at the request of social workers.47
The legislature tightened the bases for intervention in a
child's biological family by specifying the grounds on which
a court could find a "child in need of protection and serv-
ices" (CHIPS).48 The vague terms "dependency" and "ne-
glect" were deleted, as was such language as "proper"
parental care, "faults or habits" of parents, and "his occupa-
tion, behavior, condition, environment or associations are
such as to injure, endanger his welfare or that of others." 49
These criteria were replaced with eleven grounds for inter-
42. Act of June 9, 1982, ch. 384, 1981 Wis. Laws 1624; Act of Nov. 27, 1981, ch.
81, 1981 Wis. Laws 726; Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 330, 1979 Wis. Laws 1636; Act of
May 17, 1978, ch. 354, 1977 Wis. Laws 1365.
43. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
44. See Wald, supra note 11, at 628-29.
45. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 834-36 nn.35-39 (1977) (discussing foster care problems).
46. Act of May 17, 1978, ch. 354, 1977 Wis. Laws 1365.
47. Compare Wis. STAT. § 48.13 (1975) with Wis. STAT. § 48.13 (1977).
48. WIS. STAT. § 48.13 (1981-1982).
49. WIS. STAT. § 48.13 (1975).
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vention. All of them require proof of specific abuse or dan-
ger to a child, proof that the parent wants to place the child,
or proof that the child is in an illegal placement. 50
Even if grounds for intervention are proven, the court
may not place the child outside the home without investiga-
tion of other alternatives which would allow the child to re-
main with the natural parents.5 In all cases placement
terminates after one year unless extended by the court after a
hearing.5 2
In its dispositional order, the court must make specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the dispo-
sition.53 It must decide what services are required for the
child and family,54 what agency is responsible for providing
those services, 55 and, if the child is removed from the home,
what must be done by the parent or child before the child
will be returned.56 The obvious intent of the legislature was
to set some reasonable limits on intervention into families, to
ensure that once intervention does occur the purpose of that
intervention is specific and clear, and to assign responsibility
for achieving that purpose.
B. Termination of Parental Rights: Reforms
Having revised the law governing CHIPS proceedings,
the legislature turned to the termination of parental rights
and adoption process. The two major pieces of legislation
which resulted were chapter 8158 and chapter 33059 of the
Wisconsin Statutes.
In chapter 81 the legislature repealed the old law gov-
erning independent adoptions60 and created a new system by
which biological and adoptive parents may arrange for the
50. Wis. STAT. § 48.13 (1981-1982).
51. Id. § 48.355(1).
52. Id. § 48.355(4).
53. Id. § 48.355(2).
54. Id. § 48.355(1).
55. Id. § 48.355(2)(b)1.
56. Id. § 48.355(2)(b)5.
57. Id. § 48.01.
58. Act of Nov. 27, 1981, ch. 81, 1981 Wis. Laws 726 (effective Feb. 1, 1982).
59. Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 330, 1979 Wis. Laws 1636 (effective Sept. 1, 1980).
60. Wis. STAT. ch. 233 (1977), repealedby Act of Nov. 27, 1981, ch. 81, 1981 Wis.
Laws 726.
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placement and adoption of children independent of any
agency.61 The new law imposes penalties for the buying and
selling of children in Wisconsin,62 provides for an investiga-
tion of the proposed adoptive home prior to placement,63
and removes the possibility of anonymity in independent
adoptions." The new law also requires termination of the
61. The whole subject of agency versus nonagency adoptions could easily take up
another article. As the available pool of healthy infants becomes smaller, the tradi-
tional rivalry between agencies wanting children to place and others who think, for
whatever reasons, that children's parents are as competent as social workers to choose
adoptive parents, has become more bitter than ever. Agency lobbyists besiege legisla-
tors with tales of black marketing children. Advocates of independent adoption speak
of the right of a parent to place a child as he, or more often she, sees fit, ignoring the
fact that some unsavory practices do occur especially where a young mother is in-
tensely pressured by others to give up a baby in return for care and support during
her pregnancy. Both groups, unfortunately, can cite true horror stories of placements
gone sour and children suffering, just as both sides can cite many instances of good
placements resulting in the children growing up in happy families. Wisconsin's legis-
lature chose to compromise the demands of both sides, leaving independent adoptions
a legal possibility but creating a process that permits only a very committed biological
parent and an equally committed and confident adoptive parent to use the law. Since
the law has been in effect a scant year, it is not yet possible to calculate the long term
effect of chapter 81 on adoption practices in Wisconsin.
Foreign adoptions are almost as controversial as independent adoptions and con-
tested terminations because of the competing needs of couples who desperately want
but cannot have children biologically and of those who have children but may not be
able to care for them. The desire to adopt and the shortage of adoptable babies lead
many people to look to the orphanages of foreign countries for children who are
available either because they were orphaned by war or abandoned by parents who
simply could not cope with war or life-threatening poverty. The difficulty arises over
the question of whether these children were "really" free for adoption or whether
eager and overcrowded orphanages simply gave away children whose biological par-
ents never intended to give them up for adoption but became separated from them
accidentally in wartime or placed them temporarily with every intention of later re-
claiming them. The controversy hit the public press most notably around the time of
the Vietnam babylift and, like most of the controversy in this area, will never be fully
resolved. In at least two cases Vietnamese mothers have crossed the world and re-
claimed children adopted during the Vietnam babylift of 1975. See Christensen v.
Christensen, 31 IMI. App. 3d 1041, 335 N.E.2d 581 (1975); Popp v. Lucas, 7 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2162 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1980). With chapter 81 the Wisconsin Legislature
evidently hoped to ease the process for adoptive parents while still requiring some
assurance that the children who are the subjects of these proceedings have really been
freed for adoption by their parents. Again, it is too soon to tell whether this law will
fulfill its purpose.
62. Wis. STAT. §§ 48.837(2)(d), 946.716 (1981-1982).
63. Id. § 48.837(4)(c).
64. Anonymity is impossible because the petition must allege the names of the
birth parents and of the proposed adoptive parents. Id. § 48.837(2)(b). Also, the
birth parents and proposed adoptive parents must attend a hearing together. Id.
§ 48.837(5).
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biological parents' rights immediately after approval of the
child's placement in the adoptive home,65 thereby foreclos-
ing the possibility that a biological parent may reclaim the
child after an adoptive placement.66
In chapter 330 the legislature revised both the substance
and the procedure for termination of parental rights, adop-
tive placement and adoption.67 Chapter 330 is used by bio-
logical parents who wish to terminate their rights and place
their children with an agency for adoption (voluntary termi-
nations) and by agencies which seek to terminate parental
rights in order to free children for adoption (involuntary
terminations).
With the enactment of chapter 330 the legislature re-
tained much of the old law governing voluntary termination
of parental rights based on the consent of the parent.68 The
legislature made sweeping changes in the area of involuntary
terminations. It eliminated the old grounds for involuntary
termination of parental rights, which included nonsupport,
debauchery, habitual use of intoxicating liquor or drugs so
as to harm the child, and inability for a prolonged indeter-minate period of time to provide care and protection neces-
sary for the child's health, morals or well-being.69 The old
grounds were replaced by six, new, carefully defined
grounds. °
65. Id. § 48.837(6).
66. See In re R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 83 (1980), rev'k 95 Wis. 2d 573,
291 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1980). This is a tragic and much publicized case in which a
biological parent did upset an adoptive placement because under the old law a con-
sent to adoption could be revoked before the adoption became final upon a showing
that revocation would further the child's best interest.
67. Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 330, 1979 Wis. Laws 1636.
68. Compare Wis. STAT. § 48.40(l) (1977) with Wis. STAT. § 48.41 (1981-1982)
and Wis. STAT. § 48.84(l)(a) (1977) with Wis. STAT. § 48.91(2)(b) (1981-1982). The
major changes are that all adoptions must be preceded by a termination of parental
rights, not a consent to adoption, and that, with the exception of parents consenting to
a stepparent's adoption, consent to termination must be given before a judge of a
court of record. See In re D.L.S., 112 Wis. 2d 180, 332 N.W.2d 293 (1983) (discussing
the level of voluntariness required and the duties of a trial court to ascertain the
voluntariness of a minor mother's consent).
69. Wis. STAT. § 48.40(2), (3) (1977).
70. Id. § 48.415 (1981-1982).
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C Present Grounds for Terminating Parental Rights
1. Abandonment
The new law retains abandonment as a ground for termi-
nation of parental rights,7' but defines it in terms of three
different types of parental noninvolvement. The first defini-
tion covers the child literally left on the church steps or in a
stranger's garage. In that case, the agency or the county con-
cerned with the child's welfare need only wait sixty days for
an interested parent to appear before commencing proceed-
ings to free the child for adoption.72
The second basis of abandonment deals with the child
placed outside the parent's home after a CHIPS proceeding.
Rights may be terminated after the parent fails to communi-
cate with the child for a period of six months or more if the
court warned the parent at the time of the CHIPS hearing
that this is a ground for termination.73 This ground is clearly
intended to cover the child whose parent simply gives up af-
ter a court order placing the child.
The third section covers the more problematic situation
of a parent who leaves a child with a relative or friend and
does not visit, call or write to the child although access to the
child remains available. Here the legislature set a time limit
of one year before termination proceedings may be initiated
on the basis of abandonment.74 This time limit recognizes
that voluntary placements between relatives or friends may
be interpreted quite differently, especially after the parent
and the caretaker disagree as to who is to raise the child.75
The parent may rebut the presumption of abandonment
established under these definitions.76 For example, evidence
that illness, injury or military service prevented the parent
from communicating with the child might reasonably be
considered a rebuttal of abandonment, as might evidence
that the parent was driven away from the child, or that the
parent reasonably believed that stepping out of a tense fam-
71. Id. § 48.415(1).
72. Id. § 48.415(1)(a)(1).
73. Id. § 48.415(1)(a)(2).
74. Id. § 48.415(1)(a)(3).
75. See, e.g., In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981).
76. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(1)(c) (1981-1982).
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fly situation was in the child's interest. However, the burden
of defeating a finding of grounds for termination decisively
shifts to the parent who fails to communicate with the child
for the specified period.
This section shows the legislature's concern for speedy
termination and adoption of children if, but only if, the par-
ent-child relationship is interrupted to the point where it is
likely that the relationship no longer exists. It is important
to note that abandonment, undefined, remains a ground for
finding the child to be in need of protection or services." If
an abandonment occurs which does not meet the definition
for termination of parental rights, the court may intervene,
but only for the purpose of restoring or strengthening the
family relationship,7 8 not for the purpose of ending it. The
legislature has struck a balance between the child's need for
early placement and the interests of the parent, child and the
state in preserving the integrity of families.7 9
2. Continuing Need of Protection or Services
Section 48.415(2) is central to the whole legislative
scheme because it deals with the question of how long a
child must be allowed to remain in foster care while that
child's parent is given additional chances to prepare to raise
the child.80 How much time should be allowed to elapse
before a court may step in and free the child for adoption
over the parent's objections? In the case of a parent who re-
fuses to remedy the conditions that caused the court to place
the child, the legislature has established a one-year limit.8'
In the case of a parent who is unable to remedy the condi-
tions and is not progressing, a two-year limit was set.82 In
both cases the responsible agency must have made a diligent
effort to follow the court ordered treatment plan and the par-
ent must have been told by the court ordering the initial re-
moval in the CHIPS proceeding that termination could
result if the parent did not do whatever was necessary for the
77. Id. § 48.13(2).
78. Id. § 48.355(1).
79. Id. § 48.01(1)(b).
80. Id. § 48.415(2).
81. Id. § 48.415(2)(a).
82. Id. § 48.415(2)(b).
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child's return.83
The legislature has created a system under which parents
are encouraged to seek return of children. Courts must tell
parents what is required to secure return of children and to
warn parents of the possible consequences of not moving
quickly to remedy conditions which led to placement.8 4
Agencies are required to make a true effort to prepare par-
ents and children for reunion.8 5 But there is a clear end of
the road after Which the focus can and should shift to finding
a permanent arrangement for a child whose parents have
not, for whatever reason, readied themselves to make a
home for the child.8 6
83. Id. § 48.415(2).
84. Id. § 48.356.
85. Id. § 48.415(2).
86. Legislation has been introduced which would erase the distinction between
parents who refuse and parents who are unable to do what is necessary for the child's
rturn. The bill would allow termination of parental rights after the child has been
out of the home for one year if the parents have not remedied the problems and there
is a substantial likelihood the parent will not remedy the problems in the future. Wis.
A.B. 251, §§ 3-5 (1983). This change would be unfortunate. A major purpose of the
changes in the termination grounds was to make them as clear and specific as possible
and to avoid, as far as possible, the exercise of unduly wide discretion in the factfind-
ing stage of terminations. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(2) (1981-1982) does this by requiring,
for those parents alleged to be unable to remedy the condition requiring the child's
removal from the.home, proof of two years of effort toward restoring the family.
While this ground does require a prediction by the factfinder as to whether the parent
will in the future be able to have the child returned, that prediction will be based on
evidence of two years experience with the parent. In our opinion, one year of effort to
restore the family will not, in many cases, provide a sufficient basis for any accurate
prediction and could result in the destruction of families which could have been re-
stored. In proceedings which are, as the Santosky Court noted, "often vulnerable to
judgments based on cultural or class bias," the factfinder should not be allowed to
make predictions without a solid basis of fact extending over a reasonable period of
time. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The one year time limit is reasonable
where there is evidence of neglect or refusal to remedy the conditions requiring the
child's removal. But in the hazier situation of the parent who is trying but has not yet
succeeded, more time is needed.
Allowing a reasonable time is especially necessary given the realities of the social
service system. There is often a delay between the time the court orders that the child
be removed and treatment be provided and the time treatment actually begins. New
social workers may be assigned either at the beginning or during the year of treatment
which again causes delay. The same agency which must make diligent efforts to re-
store the family must also decide if a termination petition will be filed, a decision
which must be made well before the year of placement is over. One year of place-
ment is often substantially less than the equivalent of one year of diligent efforts by
the agency.
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3. Continuing Parental Disability
Section 48.415(3) allows termination of parental rights
where the parent is currently hospitalized and has been hos-
pitalized for two out of the past five years for mental illness
or developmental disability which is ikely to continue indef-
initely and where the parent or family has not arranged for
an alternative placement for the child.87 This section has
been widely criticized by advocates for the mentally ill and
the developmentally disabled on the ground that it discrimi-
nates against these parents on the basis of the nature of their
handicap instead of focusing on inability to plan for a
child.88 On the other hand, the previous article states that
disability alone should be a sufficient ground to trigger an
inquiry into whether termination would be in the child's best
interest.8 9 While societal prejudice against those with mental
illnesses, mental retardation, cerebral palsy and epilepsy
may not be as great as it used to be, it is still substantial.90
To allow social workers and courts to consider whether a
child might be better off with a parent who does not suffer
from one of these disabilities is to invite prejudice and to
discourage the provision of services which could allow the
family to function.
Section 48.415(3) allows termination of parental rights
without first making an effort to preserve the biological fam-
ily through the CHIPS system in those rare cases where the
parent's condition is so serious that long-term inpatient
treatment is required.91 The severity of the parent's condi-
tion gives rise to the conclusion either that a viable parent-
child relationship cannot be formed or that the danger to the
child is too great to take a chance.
4. Continuing Denial of Visitation Rights
Section 48.415(4) provides the basis for a custodial par-
87. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(3) (1981-1982).
88. Conversation with Robert Goldstein, Director, United Cerebral Palsy of Mil-
waukee (Mar. 4, 1983).
89. Hayes & Morse, supra note 3, at 486.
90. See generally D. ALLEN & V. ALLEN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN MENTAL RETARDA-
TION (1979); REPORT FROM A.R.C. NATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATIONl IN-
STITUTE, INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF THE CHILD, SYMPOSIUM IN SAN JUAN (1979).
91. Wis. Stat. § 48.415(3) (1981-1982).
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ent to move for the involuntary termination of the noncus-
todial parent's rights in order to clear the way for a
stepparent adoption.92 In an action affecting marriage a
court can deny visitation to a noncustodial parent if it finds
that visitation would endanger the child's physical or emo-
tional health.93 Under section 48.415(4) a denial of visita-
tion rights by the family court which continues for two years
creates grounds for termination of the noncustodial parent's
rights provided that the petitioning parent can demonstrate
that the noncustodial parent still would not be entitled to
visitation if-he or she asked for it.
94
Section 48.415(4)-is difficult to prove. However, the risk
to the child of erroneous failure to terminate is small.
Whether or not termination and adoption by the stepparent
occurs, the child will continue to live in a familial relation-
ship with the custodial parent and stepparent. While step-
parent adoptions are important, protecting the relationship,
or at least the possibility of a relationship, between children
and noncustodial parents is also important.
5. Repeated Abuse
Section 48.415(5) allows termination of rights if the par-
ent has more than once caused death or injury to one or
more children living in the parent's household resulting in
two or more felony convictions.95 At first blush this standard
appears absurdly high. Why should a parent be allowed to
kill or injure two children or injure one child twice before
the best interest of the child can be considered in a termina-
tion proceeding?
First, the law does not leave endangered children unpro-
tected. Section 48.13(3) allows the court to intervene
through the CHIPS system if a child is the victim of sexual
or physical abuse.96 The court may order the child's removal
from the home if necessary.97 If efforts to restore the family
92. Id. § 48.415(4).
93. Id. § 767.245.
94. Id. § 48.415(3), (4).
95. Id. § 48.415(5).
96. Id. § 48.13(3).
97. Id. § 48.345.
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fail, parental rights may be terminated. 98
Second, judicial discretion should be carefully limited in
the emotionally charged area of child abuse. The thought of
an injured child arouses protective feelings in most adults.
The vision of a parent who abuses his or her own child
sparks anger and disgust. The very definition of abuse
causes violent disagreement.99 To allow consideration of
whether termination is in a child's best interest based on
abuse invites punitive terminations or terminations without
a careful consideration of the likelihood that the parent-
child relationship can be strengthened or restored.
Termination of parental rights on the ground of child
abuse is the most frequently criticized subsection of the stat-
ute. Legislative changes are therefore likely.'00 However,
any change must retain a sufficiently specific definition of
the conduct which gives rise to termination so that immedi-
ate termination is possible only in the most aggravated situa-
tions of abuse. Other abused children should be protected
through the CHIPS system while treatment is provided to
the family.10 1
6. Failure to Assume Parental Responsibility
Section 48.415(6), the final basis for establishing grounds
to terminate rights, deals specifically with the rights of out of
wedlock fathers.1 0 2 It is one of the areas of the law sharply
criticized in the previous article.10 3 This section was created
to balance the rights of these fathers to raise their children
98. Id. § 48.415(2).
99. For two extreme views on the issue of child abuse, compare the Swedish law,
which makes illegal any physical punishment of children, see Adamo, New Rightsfor
Children and Parents in Sweden, CHILDREN TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 15, with the
defense position in State v. Killory, 173 Wis. 400, 243 N.W.2d 475 (1976), in which
the defendant, a psychologist and psychology professor convicted of child abuse, said
his treatment of his niece was not abuse but rather a treatment program.
100. Legislation has been introduced which would allow termination based on a
showing that "the parent has exhibited a pattern of behavior which threatens the
health of the child" and has either been convicted of a felony for causing death or
injury to a child or children or has more than once had a child removed from his or
her home in a CHIPS proceeding because of physical or sexual abuse inflicted by the
parent. Wis. A.B. 251, § 6 (1983).
101. Wis. STAT. § 48.01(l)(b), (e), (g) (1981-1982).
102. Id. § 48.415(6).
103. Hayes & Morse, supra note 3, at 482-91.
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against the competing rights of the out of wedlock mothers
to place the children for adoption without interference. Al-
though interpretations about constitutional guidelines set
down by the United States Supreme Court vary,'04 the Wis-
consin Legislature has mandated, with limited exceptions,10 5
that parents, including out of wedlock fathers, must have a
chance to raise their children before the children can be
adopted by others. 0 6
In the context of an entire system that gives biological
parents a first chance to raise children, even if these parents
are young men, the debate about the rights of out of wedlock
fathers is overblown. Many young men, far from trying to
stop adoption, willingly terminate their rights in order to
avoid any future financial responsibility. Section 48.415(6)
makes it fairly easy to terminate an uninterested father's
rights and, in fact, erects some effective barriers'07 against
frivolous protests by men who simply wish to block an adop-
tion but have no interest in taking parental responsibility.
The definition of "failure to assume responsibility" is so in-
clusive that it places the burden on the father to show that he
is a responsible, caring man before he is given the opportu-
nity to try to raise the child or to have a say in the child's
placement. For instance, evidence of nastiness to the mother
during pregnancy, or of simply ignoring her during preg-
104. See Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).
105. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(1)(a)I, (3), (5), (6) (1981-1982).
106. In light of Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978), and especially Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983), it would
not offend the due process clause if the legislature enacted a requirement that an out
of wedlock father must himself be currently capable or have family members cur-
rently capable of taking custody in order to block termination of his rights and the
child's placement for adoption. Such a standard would adequately protect the fa-
ther's right to raise his child and protect the child's right to have a parent.
Indeed, the Lehr decision seriously undercuts any constitutional claims certain out
of wedlock fathers have to notice of termination proceedings, let alone to their custo-
dial rights which could defeat a mother's desire to have a stepfather adopt a child.
Wisconsin's statute may be more protective of out of wedlock fathers' rights to notice
than is now required by the United States Constitution. Such protection may still, of
course, be required by the Wisconsin Constitution's due process clause. Wis. Const.
art. I.
107. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(6)(b) (1981-1982).
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nancy, may be used against him.1° 8 Failing to support her
during pregnancy, if the ability and opportunity were pres-
ent, will also have a negative impact. A father may face a
termination proceeding even if he has shown continued in-
terest in a baby from the day of its birth and has sought to
raise the child, or to have a relative raise the child, simply
because he and the mother had a falling out when she con-
fronted him with news of the pregnancy and he did not im-
mediately behave chivalrously. 0 9 This resistance to giving
108. See In re Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, - N.W.2d - (1983), a case de-
cided just as this article was going to press. Baby GirlK. was a four-to-three decision,
accompanied by two dissenting opinions, in which the court affirmed the termination
of an imprisoned, out of wedlock father's rights chiefly because of his conduct during
the first five months of the mother's pregnancy. During that time he was not yet in
prison and appears to have been living with the mother.
109. See State exrel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d
643 (1975). Jerry Rothstein, the appellant in the Lewis case, carried the legal battle
for unwed fathers in Wisconsin all the way to the United States Supreme Court, but
he never did get to see his child. Applying a "fitness at the time of initial hearing"
test, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a trial court determination that Mr. Roth-
stein had, in effect, abandoned the fetus by behaving like a cad to the mother in the
early months of her pregnancy. The facts that Mr. Rothstein had changed his mind
before the child's birth, had diligently pursued a chance to see the child since birth,
and was now "fit" were ignored and the adoption of the child, accomplished secretly
while the case challenging the denial of Mr. Rothstein's rights was on appeal, was
never disturbed. While the termination did not arise under Wis. STAT. § 48.415(6)
(1981-1982), the language of the final decision is similar to the provision of that stat-
ute which was enacted eight years later.
In the previous article, it was argued that an imprisoned father, unable to have
contact with a baby born after his incarceration, might be able to use his "reprehensi-
ble" conduct to block termination. See Hayes & Morse, supra note 3, at 484. We
think the length of imprisonment and the type of conviction are important and that
not all imprisoned fathers of babies should have their rights terminated. For exam-
ple, a father in jail a short time for a minor offense might have a perfectly reasonable
case for actual custody upon his release and for placement of the baby with his rela-
tives in the meantime.
In re Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, - N.W.2d - (1983) is the court's most
recent attempt to address the rights of the out of wedlock father who resists the
mother's attempt to place their baby for adoption. In that case, a sharply divided
court held that the father could not use his imprisonment itself as a defense to a
termination based on his failure to assume parental responsibility within the maning
of Wis. STAT. § 48.415(6) (1981-1982). In that case the father had not been impris-
oned until the fifth month of the mother's pregnancy and the majority focused heavily
on the father's behavior before the imprisonment. The language of the decision
makes it unclear whether the court might consider imprisonment during the first or
second month of pregnancy as creating the defense of impossibility to the ground of
failing to establish a parental relationship. However, given the prevailing tone of this
decision, which is directed toward lowering the barriers for terminating the parental
rights of out of wedlock fathers and is extremely critical of the father's criminal be-
1983]
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the minority of men who fight the termination a chance to
raise the children is unaccountable - unless the underlying
objection is that the requirement of any participation by the
father makes the mother think twice about termination and
consider alternatives, including placement with the father,
which would make adoption unnecessary.
A woman dealing with an unwanted pregnancy faces dif-
ficult choices. Her decision to have an abortion or to place
the child for adoption may be influenced by her desire not to
have continuing contact with the father. Notifying him of
the child's birth and facing the possibility that he will ask for
custody may be a painful requirement for her. If the father
does block the termination and obtain custody, the mother
will not, in all likelihood, be allowed to sever her relation-
ship with the child, even if she still wishes to do so. She will
face dealing indefinitely with an emotional tie to a child she
did not intend to raise but now has not been allowed to place
as she wished. Knowing that the father or his family might
seek custody may well prompt some mothers either not to
carry the pregnancy to term or not to attempt placement for
adoption in the first place.
A balancing of interests, however difficult, must be made.
During a pregnancy, the father has no control over whether
the mother will have the baby at all."10 After the child's
birth, the mother has the undisputed right to keep the child
and care for it until and unless a court removes custody from
her."' It is only in the case where the mother seeks to place
the child for adoption that the father's rights begin to inter-
fere with her choices. Painful though this may be for the
woman facing a former lover in a hostile situation, it is sim-
ply in keeping with the general rule that the biological fam-
ily of a child gets a first chance to raise the child before the
child is given to others.
havior, we think it unlikely that the court would allow a father imprisoned for most of
the pregnancy more rights to his child than one imprisoned later in the pregnancy.
110. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding that
neither spousal consent nor a blanket pardntal consent for abortions can be required).
Clearly the unmarried father has no standing to prevent an unmarried mother's
abortion.
111. Wis. STAT. § 48.435 (1981-1982).
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D. The Dispositional Phase
Once grounds for termination have been established at
the factfinding hearing, the court enters the dispositional
phase of the proceeding. 12 The question for the court then
becomes: "Should we terminate parental rights?" At this
stage the child's best interest becomes the paramount consid-
eration. The legislature has delineated factors which focus
on the question of whether termination will do more good
than harm.'1 3 These factors include: the likelihood of adop-
tion, the quality of the child's relationship with the parent
and the wishes of the child. Punitive termination is discour-
aged by use of these factors, and the statute makes it clear
that termination should not proceed automatically from a
finding that grounds do exist." 4
IV. TERMINATION IN THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT:
THE UNFITNESS TEST
A. In re JL.W.
At the same time the legislature was revising the whole
system for termination of parental rights, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was deciding a difficult case arising under
the 1977 termination of parental rights law." 5 The recent
case of In re JL. W 6 has caused a storm of controversy
among those lawyers, judges and social workers who work
with the termination statutes. Although the legislature has
deleted the parental fault language from the grounds for ter-
mination of parental rights, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
appears to have added the test of parental unfitness to the
standards for termination the legislature enacted.17
The facts of JL. W. are simple, although capable of dif-
ferent interpretations. The case involved two sisters strug-
gling over an infant. One sister was married and childless.
The other sister was divorced, the mother of two teenagers,
112. Id. § 48.424(4).
113. Id. § 48.426(3).
114. Id. § 48.427(2); id. § 48.01(1)(b). See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SOLNIT, supra note 13, at 7-11.
115. Wis. STAT. § 48.41 (1977).
116. 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981).
117. Id. at 135, 306 N.W.2d at 55.
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and employed as a nurse in a Boston hospital. When the
nurse became pregnant, her friends and the father of the
child encouraged an abortion, but she decided to give birth
to the baby. Thereafter she vacillated between whether to
keep the baby or to let the childless sister and her husband
raise the baby. The maternal grandmother became in-
volved on the side of the childless sister. The mother liter-
ally went back and forth on the issue of placement, but
ultimately decided to reclaim and raise her child herself.
The married sister and her husband decided to fight to keep
the child and petitioned the children's court for guardian-
ship, then termination of parental rights.
The petition was filed under the old termination law and
alleged that the mother had "abandoned" the child and had
"totally, substantially, continuously and repeatedly refused
or neglected to provide J.L.W. with parental care, protec-
tion, maintenance and support," and that she had "totally,
substantially and continuously neglected to provide J.L.W.
with subsistence, education and other care although she was
financially able to do so. ' 118
The jury found grounds did exist for termination; the
judge found that termination was in J.L.W.'s best interest
and entered an order for termination. The mother appealed
and won a unanimous order for J.L.W.'s immediate return
to her. The decision was based on the court's holding that
"except under unusual circumstances like those presented in
Quilloin, the due process protections of the state and federal
constitutions prohibit the termination of a natural parent's
rights, unless the parent is unfit."" 9
In its decision, the court relied on the holding of Stanley
v. Illinois,2 ° that "as a matter of due process of law, Stanley
was entitled to a hearing on his fitness before his children
were taken from him."' 2' The court also relied on a state-
118. Id. at 121, 306 N.W.2d at 48. No grounds for termination of parental rights
would have existed if the new law had been in effect, since the mother did not fail to
visit or communicate with the child for a full year. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(1) (1981-
1982).
119. In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 136, 306 N.W.2d at 55.
120. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
121. In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 133, 306 N.W.2d at 53 (quoting Stanley, 405
U.S. at 649).
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ment in Quilloin v. Wa/cott1, 122 that there was
little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended
[were] "a State to attempt to force the breakup of a natural
family, over the objections of the parents and their chil-
dren, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole
reasons that to do so was thought to be in the children's
best interest."' 123
In both Stanley and Quilloin (and, indeed, in later deci-
sions124) the Court wrestled with the rights of out of wedlock
fathers in custody or adoption proceedings. Before the Stan-
ley decision, out of wedlock fathers had almost no legal
rights to their biological children and were treated as stran-
gers to the children, 25 except for the duty to support. This
was in sharp contrast to the rights accorded all mothers and
married fathers who generally had to do something "wrong"
under applicable state law, usually put in terms of neglect or
other fault, before losing either custody or parental rights to
their children.126 Stanley was an out of wedlock father who
had lived with and supported his children. Upon the death
of their mother, the children were declared wards of the state
and placed with court appointed guardians.127 Under the Il-
linois law challenged in Stanley, out of wedlock fathers
could lose custody of their children based solely on evidence
that their mother was dead, while children of married par-
ents and unmarried mothers could not be removed from the
parent's custody unless there was a showing of neglect under
the Illinois statute. 128 Thus, the term "hearing on his fitness
as a parent"'' 29 was used in the Stanley opinion as a kind of
judicial shorthand for "hearing on the issue of whether the
122. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
123. In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 134, 306 N.W.2d at 54 (quoting Quilloin, 434
U.S. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977))).
124. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979).
125. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645, 648. See generally Note, Unwed Fathers andtheAdop-
tion Process, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 85 (1980-81).
126. See generally Ketcham & Babcock, Jr., Statutory Standards/or the Involun-
tary Termination ofParental Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 530 (1975-76).
127. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645, 650.
128. Id. at 646.
129. Id. at 650.
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children were neglected under applicable law."'130 The term
unfit was not defined except in reference to Illinois's neglect
statutes nor was it used to create a separate standard for re-
moval of children.
In the Quilloin case the Court decided the question of
whether an out of wedlock father who had never had legal
custody of, lived with or legitimated his child had the same
right in a contested adoption as married fathers, that is, the
right to block the adoption by withholding his consent unless
he had been adjudicated unfit. 13  The court said "no." It
concluded that, while "some showing of unfitness" would no
doubt be required to"force the breakup of a natural fam-
ily,' 32 under these facts a showing of best interest was all
that was required. 33 As in Stanley, the Court did not make
any attempt to define unfitness, but rather used the term as a
shorthand for what parental conduct might result in the for-
feiture of parental rights under state law.
In J.L W. the Wisconsin Supreme Court went one step
beyond the Stanley and Quilloin decisions in holding that,
except in unusual circumstances, parental unfitness must be
found in addition to the grounds for termination of parental
rights as determined by the legislature. 34 This requirement
of a finding of parental unfitness in termination cases raises
the difficult question of what unfitness means.
B. The Definition of Unfitness
Unfitness is a concept as slippery as the term "best inter-
est" and is almost as susceptible to manipulation by deci-
sion-makers who are personally offended by a parent's
conduct. Unfitness has never been clearly or consistently de-
fined in the many cases in which the word appears. Instead,
"unfit" seems to be a label attached to a set of facts which
describe someone whose custodial rights it appears should
130. Id. at 658.
131. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
132. Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)).
133. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
134. "While her actions may have constituted statutory grounds for termination,
they do not demonstrate her unfitness as a parent." In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 137,
306 N.W.2d at 55 at 55.
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be taken away. 35  Some cases say that to be unfit is to be
immoral, or at least imply that in discussing a parent's con-
duct.1 36 Other cases, where the trial court did not or could
not make a finding of unfitness, employ a broader definition
and hold that, since the welfare of the child is the controlling
consideration, the inquiry into fitness may extend to whether
parental characteristics exist that would make it harmful to
the child to award or to return custody to the parent. 137 This
effectively equates unfitness with a finding that custody with
the parent is not in the child's best interest.
In any event, most of the Wisconsin cases which define
or discuss unfitness are custody disputes between parents or
between a noncustodial parent and a relative. 38 These cases
illustrate the observation of many custody lawyers that trial
135. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schmidt, 71 Wis. 2d 317, 237 N.W.2d 919
(1976); Farwell v. Farwell, 33 Wis. 2d 324, 147 N.W.2d 289 (1967); State ex rel Tuttle
v. Hanson, 274 Wis. 423, 80 N.W.2d 387 (1957).
136. See, e.g., Sommers v. Sommers, 33 Wis. 2d 22, 146 N.W.2d 428 (1966); Blif-
fert v. Bliffert, 14 Wis. 2d 316, 111 N.W.2d 188 (1961).
137. See, e.g., Dees v. Dees, 41 Wis. 2d 435, 164 N.W.2d 202 (1969); Belisle v.
Belisle, 27 Wis. 2d 317, 134 N.W.2d 491 (1965); Seelandt v. Seelandt, 24 Wis. 2d 73,
128 N.W.2d 71 (1964).
138. Parental "unfitness" has been a required finding in two types of cases: first,
in cases where a child's custody in a family court action, usually a divorce, is sought
by a third party; and, second, in cases arising under pre-1975 divorce law, where a
father sought custody of a child. Under the pre-1975 law there was a strong prefer-
ence for maternal custody and fathers were practically forced to show unfitness of the
mother in order to gain custody. See Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis. 2d 570, 129 N.W.2d
134 (1964).
For an illustration of the confusion regarding the definition of unfitness as well as
a disagreement over whether unfitness need be found before a long absent father can
be deprived of legal custody, compare Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d
5 (1972) with Mawhinney v. Mawhinney, 66 Wis. 2d 679, 225 N.W.2d 501 (1975). In
the latter case, the court backed away from a firm standard favoring parents in all
cases where return of children was sought by a noncustodial parent despite that par-
ent's long absence. The Mawhinney court restored a fair amount of judicial flexibility
apparently removed in the earlier case, holding that under the circumstances de-
scribed, unfitness need not be shown. A concurring opinion said that unfitness had
been clearly demonstrated. These two cases are typical of two long lines of cases
involving noncustodial fathers litigating custody cases against the bereaved parents of
deceased custodial mothers. The cases in which the court gives the children to the
fathers emphasize the rights of fit parents. See, e.g., Ponsford, 56 Wis. 2d at 413, 202
N.W.2d at 8.
The cases in which the court leaves the children with grandparents emphasize the
necessity of giving trial courts the flexibility to make decisions in the best interests of
children. See State ex rel Tuttle v. Hanson, 274 Wis. 423, 80 N.W.2d 387 (1957);
Rattel v. Hayter, 244 Wis. 261, 12 N.W.2d 135 (1943); In re Custody of Collentine,
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courts and the Supreme Court decide all custody cases on
the facts, in trying to promote what appears to be the child's
best interest and to avoid the application of rules which seem
too inflexible for the particular case.
In In re Termination of Parental Rights to A.M.K. 139 the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals discussed the definition of unfit-
ness in the context of a termination of parental rights case.
The biological father inA.M.K appealed the termination of
his parental rights on several grounds including the claim
that the due process clauses of the state and federal constitu-
tions do not allow termination of parental rights without
consideration and rejection of less drastic alternatives to ter-
mination. 140 The court held that an examination of less dras-
tic alternatives to termination "is implicit in a finding of
unfitness."' 141  The court stated that to support a finding of
unfitness
it must appear that the [parent] has "so conducted himself,
or shown himself to be a person of such description, or is
placed in such a position, as to render it not merely better
for the children, but essential to their safety or their wel-
fare, in some very serious and important respect, that his
rights should be treated as lost or suspended, should be su-
perseded or interfered with."'142
This definition of unfitness is a modification of the best
214 Wis. 619, 254 N.W. 118 (1934); Sheers v. Stein, 75 Wis. 44, 43 N.W. 729 (1889); In
re Stillman Goodenough, 19 Wis. 291 (1865).
For cases where custody has been transferred to others at the time of divorce, see
Dees v. Dees, 41 Wis. 2d 435, 164 N.W.2d 282 (1969); Belisle v. Belisle, 27 Wis. 2d
317, 134 N.W.2d 491 (1965). In both of those cases the court grappled with the ques-
tion of whether the parent once found unfit because of emotional instability could
force return of the child upon a showing of current fitness. The Dees case held that
current fitness is not enough - the parent must show that return is in the child's best
interest. The Belisle court simply found continued "instability" despite the lack of
any such finding by the trial court. Neither court was able to define unfitness; in both
cases the obvious controlling consideration was the court's reluctance to move a child
from a grandparent with whom the child was happy and well adjusted. One is forced
to conclude that the effect of requiring findings of "unfitness" in unusual custody
cases may be to cause courts to develop even more convoluted definitions and distinc-
tions having no real general application in order to justify achieving a perceived right
result in individual cases.
139. 105 Wis. 2d 91, 312 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1981).
140. Id. at 101, 312 N.W.2d at 845.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 102, 312 N.W.2d at 846 (quoting Lemmin v. Lorfeld, 107 Wis. 264,
266, 83 N.W. 359, 360 (1900)).
1983] ADOPTION AND TERMINATION A REPLY 667
interest test at the dispositional stage of a termination case.
The court may not terminate parental rights based on a find-
ing that termination is in the child's best interest. It must
find that the termination is essential to the child's welfare.
To make this finding the court must find that alternatives to
termination which would adequately protect the child's wel-
fare do not exist.
The standard articulated by the court in A.M.K. is con-
sistent with the philosophy of the Children's Code because
of its application of the least restrictive alternative concept to
termination of parental rights1 43 and because it can be read
to emphasize the effect on the child of the continuation of
parental rights instead of the morality or character of the
parent. If this is the standard to be applied, however, there
is no reason to use the term "unfit."
Under the old law, which contained parental fault lan-
guage, consideration of parental unfitness made sense.
Under the new law, which focuses on the parent-child rela-
tionship, the concept is out of place. The use of an unfitness
standard has not added noticeable clarity or certainty to cus-
tody law144 and carries with it implications of immorality
and fault which are not necessarily relevant to the issues in a
termination case. The use of the term can also be a gratui-
tous cruelty to the parent who then not only must forever
lose rights to the child but also must forever bear the label
"unfit parent."'145
The JL. W. holding clearly requires development and
clarification by the Wisconsin courts.14 The supreme court
143. Wis. STAT. § 48.355 (1981-1982), which governs disposition of delinquency
and CHIPS cases, states:
48.355 Dispositional Orders. (1) INTErrN. In any order under s. 48.34 or 48.345
the judge shall decide on a placement and treatment finding based on evidence
submitted to the judge. The disposition shall employ those means necessary to
maintain and protect the child's well-being which are the least restrictive ofthe
rights of the parent or child and which assure the care, treatment or rehabilita-
tion of the child and the family. Wherever possible the family unit shall be
preserved and there shall be apolicy of trans/erring custodyfroram the parent only
where there is no less drastic alternative.
(emphasis added).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
145. See e.g., Dees v. Dees, 41 Wis. 2d 435, 164 N.W.2d 282, 284 (1969).
146. With In re Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, - N.W.2d - (1983), the court
has begun the process of limiting J.L. W. Unfortunately, in our opinion, the court
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
has never hesitated to correct a holding in the child welfare
chose not to examine the whole rationale for use of the unfitness test under the new
statutory framework. Nor did the court further define the meaning of unfitness
within the context of a termination proceeding. Instead, the court's four-member ma-
jority held that the unfitness test is simply not required in cases against out of wedlock
fathers who have not lived with the child and said that "the specific holding [in
J.L. .] related only to a parent who had physical custody of the child for the first
four months of the child's life and whose every action from the time she learned of
her pregnancy showed a concern for the child she was to bear." Id. at 446, - N.W.2d
at -. Justice Day, the author of the JL. W. decision, is also the author of the Baby
Girl K., decision, and it appears from the latter decision that meeting the JL W.
unfitness test is still a requirement in all termination cases except those involving out
of wedlock fathers who have never lived with their children.
It is too soon to assess the long range impact of In re Baby Girl K. The majority
appears to be overwhelmingly concerned with interpreting the law in a way that al-
most ensures ratification of an out of wedlock mother's decision to place a baby for
adoption so long as a trial court can pick enough facts out of voluminous and conflict-
ing testimony about the parents' personal relationship to make a case that the man
failed to establish a parental relationship with the child. Facts may be construed
against the father at every turn, and each attempt to show concern may be dismissed
as an attempt to harass the mother or to regain her attention. The object, it appears,
is to ensure adoption for social policy reasons.
Indeed, the court gratuitously speaks of the problems of growing welfare rolls and
the problems of illegitimacy in order to explain its decision to affirm the trial court's
finding that the father had failed to establish a parental relationship with Baby Girl
K. We cannot, of course, know what the trial court, or the appellate court would have
done had Baby Girl K.'s father been out of jail, but still impecunious, yet eager and
ready to assume her custody and move in with his own relatives. If given custody, he
would have been a candidate for Aid to Families with Dependant Children and he
also might have provided a warm, nurturing environment for his child. We hope that
the court, in this holding, is not adopting a policy that an out of wedlock father's bid
for custody should be defeated for economic reasons by a more comfortably situated
prospective adoptive family so long as the birth mother has chosen adoption for the
baby. We fear, however, that that is where the reasoning of In re Baby Girl K. leads.
If we are correct, then the gender based distinction between out of wedlock fathers
and out of wedlock mothers is far sharper than a simple reading of Wis. STAT.
§ 48A15(6) (1981-1982) would require.
In the case of out of wedlock mothers, the court has been extremely protective of
the mothers' rights to raise their children, even if that requires several years of foster
care placement, paid for by public funds, before the mothers can assume custody. See
In re D.L.S., 112 Wis. 2d 180, 332 N.W.2d 293 (1983), a case dealing with the rights
of an out of wedlock mother, was a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Abra-
hamson, one of the dissenters in Baby GirlK. In fairness, it must be noted that Justice
Abrahamson based her dissent in Baby Girl K. on her contention that section 48.415
creates an unconstitutional gender based distinction because it is not rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state purpose.
Our own position is that section 48.415 creates a legitimate gender based distinc-
tion between out of wedlock fathers and out of wedlock mothers, but that the In re
Baby Girl K. court carried the distinction much too far by abandoning a barrier (the
unfitness test) applied in all other cases to protect parents facing involuntary termina-
tion of their rights. The end result of the actual case is probably not a bad one; failure
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area if it appears that a previous decision adversely affected
the child protection system. 147 Since the United States
Supreme Court has never expressly required a finding of un-
fitness before parental rights may be terminated, 148 and in
light of the changes in the termination of parental rights law,
the court would be amply justified in holding that the Con-
stitution requires a finding that termination of parental
rights is essential to the child's welfare but does not require
that this finding be put in terms of "unfitness."
V. THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE
Taken together, chapters 81, 330 and 354 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes express a coherent legislative philosophy which
is both child-centered and protective of the legitimate claims
of biological parents. With very limited exceptions, the first
aim of the child protection system is protection or repair of
the biological family's power and integrity.1 49 Forced inter-
vention, therefore, is limited to cases where danger to a child
is demonstrated. Complaints from neighbors or ex-spouses
or former friends that the house is dirty or the child is foul-
mouthed should not trigger forced intervention; a complaint
that a two-year-old is alone in the house should and will. 5 '
The next aim of the system is to direct intervention to-
ward strengthening the family not to punish the parent for
being "bad."'' 51  If the child needs immediate protection,
services can and should be provided. However, the services
should be part of a clear and specific treatment plan which
includes conditions for return of the child, the type of serv-
ices to be provided, and the persons responsible for carrying
out the plan. No placement can last for more than one year
to terminate might have kept Baby Girl K. in foster care for a long period during her
father's imprisonment with no assurance that upon his release he would have been
able or willing to take custody and actually raise his daughter. Faced with this diffi-
cult fact situation, however, we wish that the court had either dealt with the issue of
defining parental unfitness or abandoned the concept, rather than just abandoning the
test in a difficult case.
147. See Mawhinney v. Mawhinney, 66 Wis. 2d 679, 225 N.W.2d 501 (1975);
Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d 5 (1972).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 118-33.
149. Wis. STAT. § 48.01(l)(b) (1981-1982).
150. See id. § 48.13(10).
151. See id. § 48.355(l).
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without court review. 52
Finally, if there is a placement outside the home after a
CHIPS proceeding, the court is required to warn the parent
that, unless the conditions leading to placement are reme-
died, a termination of parental rights is possible and the chil-
dren might, indeed, be "adopted out."'153 Once warned, the
parent who cannot or will not make the changes necessary to
resume responsibility can forever lose his or her right to re-
claim the child15 4 - not because the parent is "bad," but
because the child cannot wait forever in limbo for a parent
who is not making the progress necessary to be able to act as
a parent and caretaker. Only in very aggravated situations
can a parent's rights be terminated without being given a
chance and some help in restoring the family. 155
Clarity and accountability are the basic features of the
child protection and termination system as it is currently
structured. If people do their jobs, children neither drift
away in foster care nor get returned to homes where they
will be subjected to serious abuse.
Problems arise when people do not do their jobs. First, if
there has not been fair warning to parents in a CHIPS pro-
ceeding, if the court's dispositional order was vague or inad-
equate, if the social worker ignored the treatment plan and
simply let the child remain in foster care without making
any effort to work with the parent, grounds for termination
will not exist. Unfortunately, it is possible that a child who
would be better off if parental rights were terminated and
adoption occurred must remain in foster care or, worse, be
returned to a dangerous home because a social worker, judge
or prosecutor did not do his or her job. But the legislature
decided that the welfare of all children will be best protected
by a system which demands a high level of responsibility on
the part of those who seek to intervene in or terminate a bio-
152. Id. § 48.355(4). Cf. Wis. STAT. § 48.35 (1975). Under this statute the court
could transfer custody of a dependent or neglected child until age 18 and never re-
view the child's status unless someone took the initiative to fie a petition for modifi-
cation. Children could be moved innumerable times with no notice to the parent or
the court.
153. Wis. STAT. § 48.356 (1981-1982).
154. Id. § 48.415(2).
155. Id. § 48.415(1)(c)I, (3), (5).
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logical family. These demands are enforced by making
them part of the very grounds for terminating parental
rights. This certainly should be a powerful incentive to
those in the system who are concerned with acting in the best
interests of children. 156
Second, more important problems arise when the public
is unwilling or unable to spend the money necessary to im-
plement good laws. The shortage of money is probably the
single biggest problem in the child protection system. If
there were money to pay for homemakers, or even parttime
housekeepers for disabled parents or parents in crises, for
example, many child removal cases might never arise. If
there were money for "time out" day care for parents who
felt they were in danger of lashing out at children, fewer
abuse cases would arise. If there were money to subsidize
visitation between impoverished parents and their children
in foster homes on the other side of the county, more parents
could stay in close contact with their children during periods
of separation. If there were adequate funding, court work-
ers' caseloads could be reduced to the point where investiga-
tions of when to intervene might be more thorough and the
services provided to parents and children might become
more meaningful and more effective.
VI. CONCLUSION
Far from ignoring the question of a child's best interest,
the Wisconsin Legislature and Supreme Court have sought
to give content to a term that has been bandied about care-
lessly, used as a wedge between parents and children and
stretched to paper over cracks in law or logic. Wisconsin has
a system which presumes at the outset that children should
be raised by their biological parents when feasible and
which puts teeth into its standards for judicial intervention.
By limiting dangerous discretion, the legislature and the
court have not made it impossibly hard to place children for
156. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 13, at 54 & app. II,
para. 40.0, at 195, in which the authors object to making children pay for the grievous
wrongs done to their parents and imply that social workers and agencies should be
liable in tort for their professional failings. This is an interesting idea, but it probably
is politically and fiscally unrealistic.
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adoption. They have made it harder to force placement and
adoption. The debate over whether these changes promote
the best interests of children will continue.
The new laws are not perfect and may well need some
changes. However, the fact that some alterations may be
necessary should not obscure the fact that the basic structure
of the new system is a good one. We hope that those seeking
easier terminations will not succeed in persuading the legis-
lature or the courts to change this new ordering of rights
before it has had a chance to be proven as effective.
